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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Thomas E. Carbonneau* 
 
 Penn State Law was privileged to receive as invited guests the scholars and lawyers who 
contributed so effectively to the symposium on AT&T Mobility.1  The presentations and 
accompanying discussions provided greater lucidity and understanding of another significant yet 
controversial U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the topic of arbitration.  From Feerick to Moritz, we 
benefited from thorough and rigorous assessments, broadcast simultaneously from Penn State 
Law’s two campuses through the marvels of modern AV technology.  The student editors did an 
outstanding job organizing the proceedings and crafting the Yearbook volume that memorializes 
them.  The volume also includes additional professional pieces on arbitration.   
 The evaluation of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion was a judicious choice of symposium 
topic.  When Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l2 was rendered, it seemed that the reign of arbitral 
autonomy had come to a sudden and brutal end through the implementation of a judicial merits 
review standard for awards―an approach that undermined the arbitrators’ autonomous 
interpretation of the arbitral agreement.  AT&T Mobility confirmed the continuing vitality of 
judicial support for arbitration by proclaiming that legal restrictions reflecting valid state public 
policy objectives could not be applied disproportionately to arbitration agreements.  When the 
content of state contract laws disabled arbitration agreements in particular, they conflicted with 
the enforcement directive of FAA § 2 and were preempted by federal law.  As a result, class 
action waivers became a lawful part of the bargain for arbitration.  Moreover, adhesive contracts 
for arbitration were not presumed to be defective instruments by which to agree to arbitration.  
An opposite perspective, in fact, appeared to govern.  The majority opinion indicated that such 
arrangements had been, and continued to be, the standard means by which to transact business in 
the consumer sector.  Disparity of position and unilaterality, therefore, were not―per se―suspect 
means for establishing a binding contract.  Despite the errant doctrinal statement in Stolt-Nielsen, 
the Court’s compass had returned to pointing due north; the only true course by which to proceed 
in U.S. arbitration law was to continue building a sanctuary for efficient and effective private 
civil adjudication.   
 The would-be public policy debate aspect of the case made for a close ruling (4-1-4), but 
the plurality opinion spoke forcefully to the well-established content of U.S. arbitration law and 
the strength of the federal policy in favor of arbitration.  Justice Scalia appears to have become 
the Court’s “point-man” on divisive arbitration opinions, attesting to his evolution on the topic of 
arbitration.  Justice Scalia, in fact, spoke for a firmer majority in the Court’s latest pronouncement 
on arbitration.  In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,3 the Court again concluded that the 
enforcement imperative in regard to arbitration withstood the restrictive language of a consumer 
protection statute, but this time the majority was six in number, the two concurring opinions 
reflected substantial genuine agreement with the majority, and there was only a single dissent.  In 
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two per curiam opinions―KMPG LLP v. Cocchi4 and Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. 
Brown5―the Court emphasized the rule that arbitration agreements must be enforced regardless 
of state law provisions to the contrary.  
 The spectrum of opinion on the assessment of these developments is vast among 
commentators.  While it appears reasonably clear that any litigious challenge to arbitration is 
likely to fail, it is difficult to apprehend how judges (especially the Justices) are defining and 
responding to the issues of arbitration law raised by litigation.  Outcomes are often difficult to 
predict and the reasoning that brings about the result is opaque.  Consensus-building to create a 
majority contributes to the fog that envelops majority propositions on arbitration, but what 
exactly the Court decided and why are, at times, difficult to ascertain.  It often seems that the law 
of arbitration is more a product of policy than the result of analytical reasoning or the 
confrontation of jural dilemmas.  To commentators who seek to systematize the decisional rulings 
into a coherent body of legal rules for purposes of effective and transparent social governance, the 
Court’s approach to, and definition of, legal propositions in arbitration is perplexing and 
sometimes resists comprehension.  The rulings in Commonwealth Coatings Corp.,6 Volt 
Information Sciences, Inc.,7 and (especially) Stolt-Nielsen effectively illustrate the point.  Without 
a common point of reference, like legal analysis, the rhetoric of opinion-writing and the public 
portrayal of conclusions make an accurate assessment unattainable.  The reasoning in precedents 
not only engenders analytical confusion, but uncertainty as well in representational 
circumstances. 
 For example: Marmet seems to leave the door open to possible contract validation in 
other circumstances despite the untenable conclusions reached by one of the West Virginia 
courts.  Does that mean that arbitration contracts are indeed subject to the strictures of contract 
formation under state law?  If so, when and to what extent?  Does the federal policy on arbitration 
remain a trump card in this configuration?  Relatedly, what is the contemporary status of the 
holding in Volt Information Sciences?  While courts must (sometimes) enforce arbitral clauses as 
written, can state law supplant the dictates of federal law as a means of regulating arbitration?  
What standard applies to the impartiality and neutrality of arbitrators in light of the dated ruling in 
Commonwealth Coatings? Did Hall Street Associates8 irretrievably compromise the principle of 
contract freedom in arbitration?    Are there indeed two separability doctrines in U.S. arbitration 
law after Rent-A-Center v. Jackson?9  Are there two regimes for kompetenz-kompetenz―one by 
contract and the other through the application of common law?  How do the cases―Kaplan,10 
Howsam,11 Bazzle,12 and Stolt-Nielsen―sort themselves out?  Is there now an over-arching 
judicial surveillance of arbitrator determinations on jurisdiction?  How will the Court pursue its 
concern about manifest disregard and excessive litigation about arbitration in the future?  Is 
adhesion now a dead letter under the “savings clause” of FAA § 2?   
 An enormous gulf separates the bench, bar, and commentators on the specifics of the U.S. 
law of arbitration.  The interested parties appear to assess arbitration and the adjustments of 
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arbitral adjudication in remarkably different and contradistinctive ways.  The Court is the oracle 
and it alone determines what matters are important enough to consider.  It needs to reach a 
majority among its members and present or sell its determinations to the bar, the lower courts, 
other government branches, commentators, and the American public.  There is an insufficient 
number of courts and scarce resources for funding adversarial adjudication.  The Court’s agenda 
differs from the objectives that might motivate the other implicated parties.  What does the 
modern manifestation of arbitration mean to these parties and their construction of the governing 
law?  An updated legislative protocol would be useful in elucidating the content of the applicable 
law.  Some type of public discussion between the affected constituencies might also prove useful 
to defining the differences in perspective.  Penn State Law and the Yearbook intend to continue to 
provide an effective platform for discussion of the issues of arbitration law. 
